Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can

Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.

Author's Profile

Luis R. G. Oliveira
University of Houston


Added to PP

934 (#12,179)

6 months
120 (#24,338)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?