Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values
Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506 (2017)
Abstract
Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us.
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2016-08-30
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2016-08-30
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790 ( #7,914 of 69,010 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #20,753 of 69,010 )
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