The metaphysics of forces
Dialectica 63 (4):555-589 (2009)
Abstract
This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a species of causation.
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2011-03-18
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2011-03-18
Total views
1,183 ( #3,467 of 2,439,433 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #14,102 of 2,439,433 )
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