The metaphysics of forces

Dialectica 63 (4):555-589 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a species of causation.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.Lewis, David K.

View all 90 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Is Genetic Drift a Force?Pence, Charles H.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
1,024 ( #2,925 of 50,118 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
102 ( #4,848 of 50,118 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.