Causal Relata

Imagine a billiard table, with several red billiard balls. Suppose that one of them impacts another. It could be claimed that the first billiard ball, the cause, makes direct contact with the second one, the effect. If we had to generalize this for all things, not just billiard balls, we would say that "thing A causes thing B". As we shall see, both Bunge and Harman reject the preceding view of causation. They would agree that the statement "thing A causes (...) thing B" is false. This is because things do not make direct causal contact with each other, there has to be a third element that links them. In Bunge's case, two things are linked by events. In Harman's case, two real objects are linked by a sensual object. (shrink)

This paper discusses a puzzling tension in attributions of moral responsibility in cases of resultant moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for unlucky outcomes, but less-than-fully-responsible for unlucky outcomes brought about differently than intended. This tension cannot be easily discharged or explained, but it does shed light on a famous puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty Traveler.

There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps (...) between causes and effects. It is argued that whether one accepts or denies this condition, one is implicated in taking on substantial and wide-ranging philosophical positions. Therefore, it is not a trivial necessary condition of causal relations and it merits further inquiry. (shrink)

What is it for an event not to occur? This is an urgent, yet under explored, question for counterfactual analyses of causation quite generally. In this paper I take a lead from Lewis in identifying two different possible standards of non-occurrence that we might adopt and I argue that we need to apply them asymmetrically: one standard for the cause, another for the effect. This is a surprising result. I then offer a contextualist refinement of the Lewis approach in light (...) of initial problems, and discuss how the asymmetry remained hidden until now. I then relate the non-occurrence problem to issues of transitivity and proportionality in causation, before showing that a parallel problem exists for contrastivist and interventionist approaches to causation too. (shrink)

Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.

Das Verb „anfangen“ lässt sich sowohl mit einem Akteur an Subjektstelle als auch subjektlos verwenden. Sogenannte subjektlose Sätze wie „Es fängt zu regnen an“ haben freilich ein grammatisches Subjekt, aber auf die Rückfrage „Wer oder was fängt zu regnen an?“ ist die einzig mögliche Antwort „Es“ unbefriedigend. Das grammatische Subjekt fungiert in solchen Sätzen lediglich als synkategorematischer Ausdruck. Menschliche Akteure können in gehaltvollerem Sinn etwas anfangen, zum Beispiel Streit, oder, wie es bei Kant heißt, „eine Reihe von Begebenheiten“. Mit dem (...) emphatisch beschriebenen Vermögen, „eine Reihe von Begebenheiten ganz von selbst anzufangen“, bestimmt Kant das Anfangen einer Handlung als Vermögen der Erstverursachung und verschafft ihm so die gebührende Fallhöhe. Diese beiden Verwendungen von „anfangen“ markieren die Spannung zwischen dem bloßen Beginnen eines subjektlosen Naturprozesses und dem Vermögen, ein Geschehen aktiv in Gang zu setzen. Ich möchte in diesem Beitrag vier klassische Modelle des Anfangens einer Handlung diskutieren, um ihre wichtigsten Vorzüge und Nachteile miteinander zu vergleichen: die kausale Handlungstheorie, die Theorie der Akteurskausalität, die des mentalen Steuerimpulses und die der noumenalen Kausalität. Klassisch sind die vier Modelle, insofern man sie philosophiehistorisch wie folgt verorten kann: (1) Das humesche Modell: kausale Handlungstheorie, (2) Das aristotelische Modell: Akteurskausalität, (3) Das cartesische Modell: mentaler Steuerimpuls, (4) Das kantische Modell: noumenale Kausalität [...]. (shrink)

Unlike any other monograph on legal liability, Michael S. Moore’s book CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY contains a well-informed and in-depth discussion of the metaphysics of causation. Moore does not share the widespread view that legal scholars should not enter into metaphysical debates about causation. He shows respect for the subtleties of philosophical debates on causal relata, identity conditions for events, the ontological distinctions between events, states of affairs, facts and tropes, and the counterfactual analysis of event causation, and he considers all (...) these issues relevant to law. In this contribution, I defend an amended version of the COUNTERFACTUAL theory of event causation both against Moore’s criticism and against some traits of Lewis’s version of the theory. On a number of counts, I simply defend Lewis against Moore’s misdirected criticism. Moore’s unreasonable demand that all the commonplaces about causation have to FOLLOW from the counterfactual analysis rests on his mistaken claim that the counterfactual theory IDENTIFIES causation with counterfactual dependence. In other respects, I part company with Lewis in order to highlight some underrated strengths of the counterfactual approach. The common denominator of my revisions is that they make the counterfactual theory unambiguously singularist. The suggested revisions comprise: performing the counterfactual analysis with Davidsonian rather than with Lewisian events, taking seriously the ex post-character of singular causal statements, making explicit the indexical ceteris paribus clause that fixes the actual circumstances of the causing event, abandoning the alleged transitivity of causation, and, last but not least, doing everything in the correct order. The correct order is to start with bedrock intuitions about the nature of causality rather than with a general possible world semantics, and then to turn these intuitions into constraints for the class of counterfactuals that a counterfactual analysis of causation has to consider. (shrink)

The paper argues that the reconciliation of the Causal Theory of Perception with Disjunctivism requires the rejection of causal particularism – the idea that the ontology of causation is always and everywhere an ontology of particulars (e.g., events). The so-called ‘Humean Principle’ that causes must be distinct from their effects is argued to be a genuine barrier to any purported reconciliation, provided causal particularism is retained; but extensive arguments are provided for the rejection of causal particularism. It is then explained (...) how the reconciliation of the causal theory with disjunctivism can proceed on the basis of an ontology of facts. (shrink)

Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.

This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a (...) species of causation. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the only way to avoid action at a temporal distance in a temporal continuum is if effects occur simultaneously with their causes, and that in fact Newton’s second law of motion illustrates that they truly are simultaneous. Firstly, I point out that this interpretation of Newton’s second law is problematic because in classical mechanics ‘acceleration’ denotes a vector quantity. It is controversial whether vectors themselves are changes as opposed to properties of a change, and therefore (...) if they can count as effects. Secondly, I argue that the problem of action at a temporal distance is generated by the assumption that forces operate on their effects, but that this assumption is not easily reconciled with Newton’s third law of motion, which is best read as saying that forces operate between objects. On that reading, there is no problem of action at a temporal distance even in a temporal continuum just as long as interacting objects coexist. (shrink)

La philosophie contemporaine connaît une demi-douzaine de théories de la causalité. À l'époque de Kant et de Hume leur nombre a été moindre, à l'avenir on peut s'attendre à ce que leur nombre continue d'augmenter. Parmi les affirmations faites par ces théories sur la nature de la causalité, certaines sont compatibles entre elles, mais beaucoup ne le sont pas. Par conséquent, ou bien quelques-unes de ces théories sont fausses, ou bien elles ne portent pas sur le même objet. Dans ce (...) dernier cas, il y aurait plusieurs genres de causalité : différentes théories diraient quelque chose de correct à propos de différents genres de causalité. Dans cette situation, il apparaît judicieux de commencer par poser deux questions méta-théoriques : quelle est la tâche d'une théorie de la causalité, et quelles sont les données dont une telle théorie doit tenir compte ? Dans une portion considérable de la littérature philosophique sur la causalité, on cherche en vain une réponse claire à la question de savoir si le but de la théorie est l'explication du concept de causalité sous-jacent à notre pratique effective de jugement, ou au contraire sa révision. Cela va souvent de pair avec l'absence d'une justification du fait que la relation que la théorie se propose de définir peut bien être appelée relation causale. Certaines théories de la causalité hautement élaborées sur le plan technique, comme par exemple certaines variantes probabilistes de la théorie de la régularité où les théories plus récentes du transfert, donnent parfois l'impression que c'est la physique qui détient le monopole de définition en ce qui concerne la nature de la relation causale. Un représentant de la théorie du transfert affirme avec un pathos scientiste inébranlable „que la science physique a découvert la nature de la relation causale dans un large ensemble de cas“. Mais comment les sciences de la nature pourraient-elles découvrir quelque chose de ce genre ? La clarification de l'essence de la relation causale est une tâche philosophique par excellence qui relève plus particulièrement de la métaphysique. Le fait qu'il soit souvent nécessaire, au cours d'une recherche métaphysique, de faire appel à des connaissances scientifiques, ne change rien à l'affaire. Il s'agit d'une tache de métaphysique descriptive, que Strawson a caractérisée comme l'entreprise qui consiste à dégager les traits les plus généraux de la structure effective de notre pensée sur le monde. L'idiome causal est profondément ancré dans les langues naturelles ; et le concept de causalité que nous possédons effectivement se reflète dans notre pratique de jugements causaux. Cela ne signifie pas qu’il soit possible d'extraire directement de cette pratique un concept cohérent de causalité. Notre pratique de jugement possède de nombreux aspects et n'est pas dépourvue d'éléments douteux. Pour des besoins philosophiques, notre pratique effective de jugement a besoin d'une certaine discipline ; c'est en ce sens que je parle de la pratique éclairée de jugement causal. Je considère que c'est notre pratique éclairée de jugement causal qui fournit les données dont la théorie de la causalité doit tenir compte ; et la tâche primordiale d'une telle théorie consiste à indiquer les conditions de vérité de cas non controversés d'énoncés causaux singuliers. [...] . (shrink)

The short paper continues a debate on free will, causation and laws of nature between the author and the German philosopher Peter Rohs (opened in a previous issue of the same journal). Both Keil and Rohs are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. Keil maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i.e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, Keil holds that no exceptionless laws subsuming cause-effect pairs (...) exist. He further claims that the primary task of a philosophical theory of causality is to give truth conditions for uncontroversial instances of singular causal statements. This is an exercise in descriptive metaphysics. Causality’s place in advanced physics, by contrast, remains precarious. The paper closes with the incompatibilist claim that deterministic causality, unlike real-world causality, cannot be reconciled with free will. (shrink)

The short paper is a reply to a review of the author’s book HANDELN UND VERURSACHEN (Frankfurt am Main 2000). The reviewer, Peter Rohs, has focused upon the issues of causation, laws of nature and free will. Both Rohs and the author are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. The author maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i. e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, he (...) holds that no exceptionless generalizations subsuming cause-effect pairs exist. He defends a singularist version of the counterfactual analysis of event causality instead. This analysis has application to both physical and mental events, so that no special kind of mental causation needs to be assumed. The paper is divided into five sections: (1) The skeptical view of laws of nature, (2) Causal relata, (3) Churchland’s law of action, (4) Counterfactual conditionals and knowledge of regularities, (5) Freedom and determinism. The debate is continued in a later issue of the same journal. (shrink)

In this article, I weigh in on the debate between "Humeans" and "New Humeans" concerning David Hume's stance on the existence of causal connections in "the objects." According to New Humeans, Hume believes in causal connections; according to Humeans, he does not. -/- My argument against New Humeans is that it is too difficult to reconcile Hume's repeated claims that causal connections are inconceivable with any belief that they these inconceivable somethings still exist. Specifically, Hume either assumes or does not (...) assume that causal connections do or must exist. If he does not, then the New Hume is false. If he does, then it is only reasonable to expect him to do one of two things: (1) provide explicit and unambiguous statements to the effect that he still believes that causal connections do or must exist despite his belief that we cannot even conceive of them and/or (2) provide textual evidence that he subscribes to a reason for believing that causal connections do or must exist in the objects despite his belief that we cannot even conceive of them. I then argue that Hume never satisfies either (1) or (2). -/- My ultimate conclusion is not that the New Hume is false. On the contrary, in section IX, I will argue that the New Hume is still a viable possibility if we attribute a certain other position to Hume – what I will refer to as "Newtonian Empiricism." But I will also argue that this rather plausible interpretation of Hume is equally consistent with Hume's being an agnostic about causal connections and Hume's being a Humean about causal connections. Therefore while we have no good reason to subscribe to the New Hume (rather than Hume's being an agnostic or a Humean), we cannot conclusively rule out this interpretation. (shrink)

Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...) causation. (shrink)

Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is (...) deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes. (shrink)