Evidentialism, Stubborn Counterevidence and Horrendous Evils

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):92-97 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Dormandy argues that stubborn counterevidence provides a reason for Evidentialists to form negative beliefs about God. Focusing on ‘horrendous evils’ as a kind of stubborn counterevidence, I discuss two possible interpretations of Dormandy’s account (a stronger and a weaker view). Against the stronger view, I consider the case of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist, that is, an evidentialist who possesses a defeater belief against horrendous evils. I argue that it would be improbable that she would form negative beliefs about God on the basis of horrendous evils alone. I consider the response of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist towards horrendous evils, arguing that for her, ‘honesty’, which results in a psychological struggle, is an excellent-making property of her faith.

Author's Profile

Daryl Ooi
National University of Singapore

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-11-12

Downloads
186 (#70,182)

6 months
56 (#69,812)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?