A puzzle about seeing for representationalism

Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646 (2020)
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Abstract

When characterizing the content of a subject’s perceptual experience, does their seeing an object entail that their visual experience represents it as being a certain way? If it does, are they thereby in a position to have perceptually-based thoughts about it? On one hand, representationalists are under pressure to answer these questions in the affirmative. On the other hand, it seems they cannot. This paper presents a puzzle to illustrate this tension within orthodox representationalism. We identify several interesting morals which may be drawn in response, each of which teaches us something interesting and important about perceptual experience and its interface with cognition and related phenomena.

Author Profiles

Assaf Weksler
University of Haifa
James Openshaw
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes

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