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Pruss, motivational centrality, and probabilities attached to possibility premises in modal ontological arguments
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):65-85 (2012)
Abstract
This paper is a critique of a paper by Alex Pruss. I argue that Pruss's attempt to motivate acceptance of the key possiblity premise in modal ontological arguments fails.Author's Profile
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2014-05-02
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512 (#45,989)
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89 (#62,887)
2014-05-02
Downloads
512 (#45,989)
6 months
89 (#62,887)
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