Uncaused Beginnings

Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):61-71 (2010)
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I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an uncaused initial state.
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Divine Causation.Oppy, Graham

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