Ultimate naturalistic casual explanations

In Ty Goldschmidt (ed.), Why is the something rather than nothing? Routledge. pp. 46-63 (2013)
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Abstract
This paper discusses attempts to explain why there are more than zero instances of the causal relation. In particular, it argues for the conclusion that theism is no better placed than naturalism to provide an "ultimate causal explanation".
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Archival date: 2016-03-16
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2014-06-07

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