Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implication

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Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications Abstract The divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma has been the focus of much recent philosophico-theological discourse, even though the problem is centuries old. In the attempt to solve the dilemma, there have been some modifications on the traditional definition of divine foreknowledge. Some of the philosophical attempts to solve the dilemma include Molinism, Boethianism, Ochamism, Opentheism and others. While these attempts are noteworthy, their basic flaws lie in their methodologies which involve a compromise of major orthodox theistic attributes and this compromise has a lot of theological implications. Contrarily, Augustine, in his attempt to solve the dilemma offered, a logical-based solution without taking recourse to a compromise of God’s foreknowledge in one hand, and libertarian-freewill on the other. Therefore, the researcher finds Augustine’s solution more plausible because it makes use of logical reasoning, biblical-support and because the Augustine’s solution to the Dilemma has a lot of implications to the contemporary discourse on Christian-theodicy. In view of this, the paper, using critical method, attempts to x-ray some of the attempts to solve the dilemma, points out their weaknesses and juxtapose them with that of Augustine, showing that Augustine’s solution is more logical. Finally the paper points out the theodical-utility of Augustine’s solution to orthodox-Christianity.
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Archival date: 2015-11-23
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