Normative Judgment and Rational Requirements: A Reply to Ridge

Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):281-290 (2018)
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Abstract
I examine and rebut Ridge’s two arguments for Capacity Judgment Internalism (simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative judgments are necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any independent desire). First, the rejection of the possibility of anormativism (sec. 2), second, an argument from the rational requirement to intend to do as one judges that one ought to do (sec. 3). I conclude with a few remarks about the nature of this requirement and about verdicts of akrasia. (sec. 4).
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Archival date: 2018-06-26
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Impassioned Belief.Ridge, Michael

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