Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy

Dialogue 41 (3):551-568 (2002)
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Abstract

Philosophers of the modern period are often presented as having made an elementary error: that of confounding the attitude one adopts toward a proposition with its content. By examining the works of Locke and the Port-Royalians, I show that this accusation is ill-founded and that Locke, in particular, has the resources to construct a theory of propositional attitudes.

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Walter Ott
University of Virginia

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