“Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”

In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 361 (2013)
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In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I offer a tentative suggestion as to how a hallucinatory experience may still be mistaken for a genuine perceptual experience.
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