Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires

Ethics 132 (3):598-620 (2022)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that, insofar as we endorse the general idea that desires play an important role in well-being, we ought to believe that their significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being, and aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being. Desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for well-being insofar as the relevant desires involve some combination of attraction and aversion. I defend these claims by illustrating how our desires can be asymmetrical. They can have greater positive than negative significance for well-being, or vice versa.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-09-03
Latest version: 2 (2021-11-04)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
277 ( #26,879 of 69,040 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
148 ( #4,091 of 69,040 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.