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Daniel Pallies
University of Southern California
  1. An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
    What makes it the case that a given experience is pleasurable? According to the felt-quality theory, each pleasurable experience is pleasurable because of the way that it feels—its “qualitative character” or “felt-quality”. According to the attitudinal theory, each pleasurable experience is pleasurable because the experiencer takes certain attitudes towards it. These two theories of pleasure are typically framed as rivals, but it could be that they are both partly right. It could be that pleasure is partly a matter of felt-quality, (...)
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  2.  39
    Why Humean Causation Is Extrinsic.Daniel Pallies - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):139-148.
    According to a view that goes by “Humeanism,” causal facts supervene on patterns of worldly entities. The simplest form of Humeanism is the constant conjunction theory: a particular type-F thing causes a particular type-G thing iff (i) that type-Fis conjoined with that type-G thing and (ii) all F’s are conjoined with G’s. The constant conjunction theory implies that all causation is extrinsic, in the following sense: for all positive causal facts pertaining to each possible region,it’s extrinsic to that region that (...)
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  3.  85
    Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires.Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Many philosophers endorse the view that desires play an important role in well-being. I argue that, insofar as we endorse this general idea, we ought to believe that desire’s significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being: its satisfaction is good for us, but its frustration is not bad for us. Aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being: its frustration is bad for us, but its satisfaction (...)
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  4. How Do We Differ When We Differ in Tastes?Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    My partner loves the experiences she gets from eating olives. I, on the other hand, hate the experiences I get from eating olives. We differ in tastes. But how exactly do we differ? In particular: do our taste experiences differ phenomenologically—that is, do my olive-experiences feel different than my partner’s olive-experiences? Some philosophers have assumed that the answer is “no,” and have advanced important arguments which turn on this assumption. I argue that, contrary to what these philosophers assume, ordinary taste (...)
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  5.  70
    The Pleasure Problem and the Spriggean Solution.Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Some experiences—like the experience of drinking a cool sip of water on a hot day—are good experiences to have. But when we try to explain why they are good, we encounter a clash of intuitions. First, we have an objectivist intuition: plausibly, the experience is non-derivatively good for me just because it feels the way that it does. It ‘feels good’. Thus, any experience of the same kind would be good for the person who has it. That experience would also (...)
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