Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief

Ratio 31 (2):179-196 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences and disagreements involving outright beliefs? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B's doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice-versa.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-11-22
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
73 ( #49,758 of 2,448,492 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #49,582 of 2,448,492 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.