Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes

Synthese:1-27 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PALIAT-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-11-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.
Rational Endorsement.Fleisher, Will

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-10-20

Total views
84 ( #28,965 of 43,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #17,526 of 43,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.