Philosophical Equilibrism, Rationality, and the Commitment Challenge

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls ‘equilibrism’. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is ‘to find what equilibria there are that can withstand examination’ (Beebee 2018, p. 3). In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PALPER-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-11-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Higher-Order Evidence.Christensen, David
Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement.Belleri, Delia & Palmira, Michele

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-09-22

Total views
29 ( #32,797 of 38,052 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #13,652 of 38,052 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.