Semantic Information and the Complexity of Deduction

Erkenntnis 88 (4):1-22 (2023)
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Abstract

In the chapter “Information and Content” of their Impossible Worlds, Berto and Jago provide us with a semantic account of information in deductive reasoning such that we have an explanation for why some, but not all, logical deductions are informative. The framework Berto and Jago choose to make sense of the above-mentioned idea is a semantic interpretation of Sequent Calculus rules of inference for classical logic. I shall argue that although Berto and Jago’s idea and framework are hopeful, their definitions do not capture what is intended. This is so because the definitions are solely based on the logical complexity of an argument and they fail to capture the richness of the non- logical content of that argument. Then I will suggest some amendments to address this problem. Finally, I will extend the application of the definitions to first-order logic. It shall be observed that in some classical deductions, applying contraction may lead to hiding some epistemic impossibilities. This happens when formulae which contribute different propositions to the proof get contracted at the quantified level.

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Salman Panahy
University of Melbourne

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