Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):173–184 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

Author's Profile

Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-24

Downloads
469 (#30,496)

6 months
106 (#30,222)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?