Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

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Abstract
The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.
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2019, 2020
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PARSUF-2
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First archival date: 2019-08-24
Latest version: 2 (2019-09-25)
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2019-08-24

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