The Pessimistic Induction and the Golden Rule

Problemos 93:70-80 (2018)
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Abstract
Nickles (2017) advocates scientific antirealism by appealing to the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, the illusion hypothesis (Quoidbach, Gilbert, and Wilson, 2013), and Darwin’s evolutionary theory. He rejects Putnam’s (1975: 73) no-miracles argument on the grounds that it uses inference to the best explanation. I object that both the illusion hypothesis and evolutionary theory clash with the pessimistic induction and with his negative attitude towards inference to the best explanation. I also argue that Nickles’s positive philosophical theories are subject to Park’s (2017a) pessimistic induction over antirealists.
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2018
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First archival date: 2018-04-09
Latest version: 2 (2018-04-28)
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