An Argument Against Papineau’s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience

Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind 3 (2023)
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In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (2021), David Papineau argues against standard theories of sensory experience: the sense datum view, representationalism, naïve realism, and so on. The only view left standing is his own “qualitative view”. On Papineau’s physicalist version, all experiences are nothing but neural states, and the only features essentially involved in experience are intrinsic neural properties (29-30, 95-97). In my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against this kind of view (also Pautz 2010, 2017). Here I elaborate on that argument in the light of Papineau’s discussion.

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Adam Pautz
Brown University


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