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Profile: Adam Pautz (Brown University)
Profile: Adam Pautz
  1. What is Integrated Information Theory a Theory Of?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    It's not clear what integrated information theorists (Koch, Tononi) are saying. And their view lacks the resources to explain even very rudimentary facts about experiences.
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  2. A Simple View of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
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  3.  84
    Can Russellian Monism Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    I develop a new argument against Russellian Monism about consciousness.
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  4.  19
    Does the Rich Content View of Experience Matter?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    Does it matter whether we perceptually represent tomato-hood?
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  5. Experiences Are Representations: An Empirical Argument (Forthcoming Routledge).Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge.
    In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.
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  6. Propositions and Properties.Adam Pautz - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):478-486.
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  7.  19
    Inquiry and Belief: Comments on Jane Friedman.Adam Pautz - manuscript
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  8.  39
    Outside Color.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    I raise some objections to the theory presented in *Outside Color*.
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  9. Color Eliminativism.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    Philosophical theories of color divide over two issues. First, there is the issue of Reductionism versus Primitivism. _Reductionism_ holds that colors are identical with physical properties, dispositional properties, or other properties specifiable in non-chromatic terms.
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  10.  14
    The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain- Based Theory of Consciousnes.Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. pp. 237-298.
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  11.  82
    Colour, Philosophical Perspectives.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken & Tim Bayne (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149.
    An overview of the main positions on colour.
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