A Simple View of Consciousness

In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
Categories
Reprint years
2009, 2010
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PAUCAS
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-08-25
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-09-15

Total views
597 ( #7,411 of 54,566 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #29,879 of 54,566 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.