Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory: A Multistage Account of Intentionality

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind (2021)
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Abstract
In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states. This account develops the multistage Lewisian approach presented at the end of my earlier "Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?" (2013).
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First archival date: 2020-10-15
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