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Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge)
In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge (2016)
Abstract
In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2016-03-23
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2016-03-23
Downloads
1,590 (#5,940)
6 months
106 (#33,913)
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