Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge)

In Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge (forthcoming)
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In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.

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Adam Pautz
Brown University


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