Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge)

In Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.
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First archival date: 2016-03-23
Latest version: 3 (2019-07-16)
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The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.
Two Conceptions of Phenomenology.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-17.

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