First personal modes of presentation and the structure of empathy

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):189-207 (2017)
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I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your future selves.

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L. A. Paul
Yale University


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