Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234 (2013)
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Abstract
I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence plays the central role in fixing mental content and ruling out deviant interpretations. However I point out a huge unnoticed problem, the problem of evidence: Lewis really has no theory of sensory content and hence no theory of what fixes evidence. I suggest a way of plugging this hole in Lewis's theory. On the resulting theory, which I call " phenomenal functionalism", there is a sense in which sensory phenomenology is the source of all determinate intentionality. Phenomenal functionalism has similarities to the theories of Chalmers and Schwitzgebel
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The Primacy of the Mental.Rickabaugh, Brandon

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Normative Reference Magnets.Williams, J. Robert G.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Mendelovici, Angela & Bourget, David
Phenomenal Intentionality.Bourget, David & Mendelovici, Angela

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