Identity Physicalism vs Ground Physicalism about Consciousness

In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism.

Author's Profile

Adam Pautz
Brown University

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-04-20

Downloads
323 (#49,464)

6 months
152 (#19,466)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?