Naive Realism and the Science of Consciousness (2018)

Abstract

I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical results. Next, I develop two new empirical arguments against simple naive realism. Then I briefly look at two new, more complex forms of naïve realism: one due to Keith Allen and the other due to Heather Logue and Ori Beck. I argue that they are not satisfactory retreats for naive realists. The right course is to reject naive realism altogether. My stalking horse is contemporary naive realism but there is a larger, positive lesson: new empirical results support a brain-based theory of sensory consciousness.

Author's Profile

Adam Pautz
Brown University

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