Naive Realism v Representationalism: An Argument from Science

In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (eds. Cohen and McLaughlin) (forthcoming)
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This paper elaborates on an argument in my book *Perception*. It has two parts. In the first part, I argue against what I call "basic" naive realism, on the grounds that it fails to accommodate what I call "internal dependence" and it requires an empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. Then I turn Craig French and Ian Phillips’ modified naïve realism as set out in their recent paper "Austerity and Illusion". It accommodates internal dependence. But it may retain the empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. And it faces other empirical problems. Representationalism about experiences avoids those problems and is to be preferred.

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Adam Pautz
Brown University


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