The Internal Physical State View of Sensory Experience (chapter from my forthcoming book)

In Perception (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state view of sensory experience (Papineau, McLaughlin, others). I criticize an argument against it based on the "transparency observation". Then I develop two alternative arguments against it. The first is a Leibniz's Law argument based on the essentially externally directed character of some experiences. The second concerns "brains in vats". Finally I consider a recent response due to David Papineau, which involves rejecting essential external directedness.
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First archival date: 2020-07-07
Latest version: 2 (2020-07-21)
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