Explanatory reasoning in the material theory of induction

Metascience 31 (3):303-309 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his recent book, John Norton has created a theory of inference to the best explanation, within the context of his "material theory of induction". I apply it to the problem of scientific explanations that are false: if we want the theories in our explanations to be true, then why do historians and scientists often say that false theories explained phenomena? I also defend Norton's theory against some possible objections.

Author's Profile

William Peden
Johannes Kepler University of Linz

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-20

Downloads
442 (#50,054)

6 months
130 (#34,481)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?