Imprecise Probability and the Measurement of Keynes's "Weight of Arguments"

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many philosophers argue that Keynes’s concept of the “weight of arguments” is an important aspect of argument appraisal. The weight of an argument is the quantity of relevant evidence cited in the premises. However, this dimension of argumentation does not have a received method for formalisation. Kyburg has suggested a measure of weight that uses the degree of imprecision in his system of “Evidential Probability” to quantify weight. I develop and defend this approach to measuring weight. I illustrate the usefulness of this measure by employing it to develop an answer to Popper’s Paradox of Ideal Evidence.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
102 ( #23,632 of 39,921 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
102 ( #3,995 of 39,921 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.