The Frontier of Time: The Concept of Quantum Information

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Abstract
The concept of formal transcendentalism is utilized. The fundamental and definitive property of the totality suggests for “the totality to be all”, thus, its externality (unlike any other entity) is contained within it. This generates a fundamental (or philosophical) “doubling” of anything being referred to the totality, i.e. considered philosophically. Thus, that doubling as well as transcendentalism underlying it can be interpreted formally as an elementary choice such as a bit of information and a quantity corresponding to the number of elementary choices to be defined. This is the quantity of information defined both transcendentally and formally and thus, philosophically and mathematically. If one defines information specifically, as an elementary choice between finiteness (or mathematically, as any natural number of Peano arithmetic) and infinity (i.e. an actually infinite set in the meaning of set theory), the quantity of quantum information is defined. One can demonstrate that the so-defined quantum information and quantum information standardly defined by quantum mechanics are equivalent to each other. The equivalence of the axiom of choice and the well-ordering “theorem” is involved. It can be justified transcendentally as well, in virtue of transcendental equivalence implied by the totality. Thus, all can be considered as temporal as far anything possesses such a temporal counterpart necessarily. Formally defined, the frontier of time is the current choice now, a bit of information, furthermore interpretable as a qubit of quantum information.
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PENTFO-10
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Archival date: 2020-08-15
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2020-08-15

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