Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):979-996 (2018)
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This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its pitfalls.

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Timothy Perrine
Rutgers - New Brunswick


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