Abstract
Bealer’s argument against Kripke is presented. We then show how Kripke could counteract it. Our idea that the identity materialist may have the possibility of explaining why type
psychophysical identities only appear to be contingent (but are necessary), because we confuse the exemplified properties (one property) with the concepts that subsume them (two
distinct concepts), is supported by McGinn’s and Nagel’s materialistic intuitions. It remains to be seen whether a critique of Kripke like that of Bealer runs counter to the exemplified properties and the concepts that subsume them. We argue that Bealer’s criticism of Kripke
does not contradict it. McGinn’s and Nagel’s intuitions support our idea. What we want to show is that, even if, from the anti-materialist side of the debate about the mind–body identity thesis, Bealer and Kripke agree on the general anti-materialist strategy but not on the strategies of phenomenological explanation (which for Bealer, Kripke neglects) and descriptivist explanation (which for Bealer is wrong), the disagreement between Bealer and
Kripke still leaves open the materialist explanation of one property and two concepts. If there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency, it is quite possible that these type psychophysical identities are indeed necessary.