Conceptions of Epistemic Value

Episteme:1 - 19 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-08-20
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
62 ( #53,344 of 64,071 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #11,671 of 64,071 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.