Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception

Dissertation, University of Oxford (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This dissertation explores several illuminating points of intersection between the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of vagueness. Among other things, I argue: (i) that it is entirely unhelpful to theorize about perception or consciousness using Nagelian "what it's like" talk; (ii) that a popular recent account of perceptual phenomenology (representationalism) conflicts with our best theory of vagueness (supervaluationism); (iii) that there are no vague properties, for Evans-esque reasons; (iv) that it is impossible to insert "determinacy" operators into representationalism in a truth-preserving manner; and (v) that strong versions of dualism are unable to accommodate the possibility of borderline consciousness.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PERVAT-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-01-21

Total views
861 ( #2,814 of 43,699 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
64 ( #10,313 of 43,699 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.