Results for 'contents of perception'

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  1. (1 other version)The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion.Bill Wringe - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):275-297.
    Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been attacked by philosophers who hold that the content of perception is (...)
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  2. Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1407-1418.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. (...)
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  3. Affordances and the Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oup Usa. pp. 39-76.
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  4. Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
    After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.
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  5. Contents of Unconscious Color Perception.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):665-681.
    In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue (...)
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  6. The double content of perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):225-243.
    Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y?(X?) as a higher level of (...)
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  7. Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):569-587.
    This paper examines Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis about the two visual streams and raises the questions of whether properties in egocentric space (commonly associated with the vision-for-action, or "dorsal," stream) can be part of the phenomenal content of perceptual experience, or only properties in allocentric space (commonly associated with the vision-for-perception, or "ventral," stream) can play this role, and how (if at all) properties in egocentric space differ from properties in allocentric space. These questions are reminiscent of issues raised (...)
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  8. Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception.Colin Marshall - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1411-1433.
    It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the puzzle have deep (...)
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  9. The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg. [REVIEW]Craig French - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):339-349.
    The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by SchellenbergSusanna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 272.
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  10. Philosophy of Perception and the Phenomenology of Visual Space.Gary Hatfield - 2011 - Philosophic Exchange 42 (1):31-66.
    In the philosophy of perception, direct realism has come into vogue. Philosophical authors assert and assume that what their readers want, and what anyone should want, is some form of direct realism. There are disagreements over precisely what form this direct realism should take. The majority of positions in favor now offer a direct realism in which objects and their material or physical properties constitute the contents of perception, either because we have an immediate or intuitive acquaintance (...)
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  11. (1 other version)The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  12. The phenomenal content of experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to (...)
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  13. Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Most of those who hold that emotions involve appraisals also accept that the content of emotions is nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for the difference between emotions and evaluative judgements. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose to the case of emotions. The paper (...)
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  14. Perspectival content of visual experiences.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The usual visual experiences possess a perspectival phenomenology as they seem to present objects from a certain perspective. Nevertheless, it is not obvious how to characterise experiential content determining such phenomenology. In particular, while there are many works investigating perspectival properties of experienced objects, a question regarding how subject is represented in visual perspectival experiences attracted less attention. In order to address this problem, I consider four popular phenomenal intuitions regarding perspectival experiences and argue that the major theories of perspectival (...)
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  15. Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.
    Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world — that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: Which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the following proposal: if your experience e immediately justifies you (...)
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  16. The Contents of Olfactory Experience.Christopher Mole - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):173-79.
    Clare Batty has recently argued that the content of human olfactory experience is 'a very weak kind of abstract, or existentially quantified content', and so that 'there is no way things smell'. Her arguments are based on two claims. Firstly, that there is no intuitive distinction between olfactory hallucination and olfactory illusion. Secondly, that olfaction 'does not present smell at particular locations', and 'seems disengaged from any particular object'. The present article shows both of these claims to be false. It (...)
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  17. Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
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  18. (2 other versions)A Direct Object of Perception.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (1):28-36.
    I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that (...)
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  19. Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception.David de Bruijn - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):540-569.
    In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, (...)
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  20.  94
    On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I (...)
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  21. The hybrid contents of memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1263-1290.
    This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I (...)
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  22.  32
    The Cone of Perception.Parker Emmerson - 2010
    I write this introduction with much work already completed in this 4th Edition of The Cone of Perception, primarily to frame the work and touch on what might be missing from it. Namely → though it is hardly lacking these, I’d like to add a few insights about the content of the work and its relevance to the subject and future technology. Why is this work still relevant? How can you use it in your work/subject/area/field, and how am I (...)
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  23. Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception.Ryan Perkins - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This dissertation explores several illuminating points of intersection between the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of vagueness. Among other things, I argue: (i) that it is entirely unhelpful to theorize about perception or consciousness using Nagelian "what it's like" talk; (ii) that a popular recent account of perceptual phenomenology (representationalism) conflicts with our best theory of vagueness (supervaluationism); (iii) that there are no vague properties, for Evans-esque reasons; (iv) that it is impossible to insert "determinacy" operators into (...)
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  24. Contours of Vision: Towards a Compositional Semantics of Perception.Kevin J. Lande - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Mental capacities for perceiving, remembering, thinking, and planning involve the processing of structured mental representations. A compositional semantics of such representations would explain how the content of any given representation is determined by the contents of its constituents and their mode of combination. While many have argued that semantic theories of mental representations would have broad value for understanding the mind, there have been few attempts to develop such theories in a systematic and empirically constrained way. This paper contributes (...)
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  25. Nonveridical biosemiotics and the Interface Theory of Perception: implications for perception-mediated selection.Brian Khumalo & Yogi Hale Hendlin - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):1-19.
    Recently, the relationship between evolutionary ecology and perceptual science has received renewed attention under perception-mediated selection, a mode of natural selection linking perceptual saliency, rather than veridicality, to fitness. The Interface Theory of Perception (ITP) has been especially prominent in claiming that an organism’s perceptual interface is populated by icons, which arise as a function of evolved, species-specific perceptual interfaces that produce approximations of organisms’ environments through fitness-tuned perceptions. According to perception-mediated selection, perception and behavior calibrate (...)
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  26. Can You See a Ganzfeld? A Critical Notice of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, Susanna Schellenberg, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, xv + 251 pp., £69.00 (hbk), ISBN: 9780191866784 (online), 9780198827702 (print). [REVIEW]John Dorsch - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):224-231.
    The first premise of Schellenberg’s particularity argument reads, “If a subject S perceives a particular α, then S discriminates and singles out α” (2018: 25). But this is false if seeing a ganzfeld is possible (i.e., a homogeneous field without any particulars to discriminate). In response, Schellenberg argues that seeing a ganzfeld is impossible by appealing to the ganzfeld effect (viz. hallucinatory experiences caused by ganzfeld exposure) exclusively as a ‘sense of blindness’. I present two challenges for this line of (...)
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  27. The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
    A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology (...)
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  28. Content Disjunctivism and the Perception of Appearances.Martin A. Lipman - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (18).
    Content disjunctivism is the view that veridical experience involves contents and objects that differ from those of corresponding hallucinations. On one formulation of this view, we are aware of ordinary material things in our surroundings when we experience veridically, and we are aware of mere appearances when we hallucinate. This paper proposes a way of developing this view and offers some considerations in support. Central to the proposed regimentation will be a distinction between different notions of appearance. We distinguish (...)
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  29. The perception of representational content.John Dilworth - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (4):388-411.
    How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of (...)
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  30. Introduction to Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.Mohan Matthen - 2015 - In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1-25.
    Perception is the ultimate source of our knowledge about contingent facts. It is an extremely important philosophical development that starting in the last quarter of the twentieth century, philosophers have begun to change how they think of perception. The traditional view of perception focussed on sensory receptors; it has become clear, however, that perceptual systems radically transform the output of these receptors, yielding content concerning objects and events in the external world. Adequate understanding of this process requires (...)
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  31. The twofold orientational structure of perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):187-203.
    I argue that perceptual content involves representations both of aspects of objects, and of objects themselves, whether at the level of conscious perception, or of low-level perceptual processing - a double content structure. I present an 'orientational' theory of the relations of the two kinds of perceptual content, which can accommodate both the general semantic possibility of perceptual misrepresentation, and also species of it involving characteristic perceptual confusions of aspectual and intrinsic content. The resulting theoretical structure is argued to (...)
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  32. Contents and Vehicles in Analog Perception.Jacob Beck - 2023 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 55 (163):109–127.
    Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual contentand my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that theperception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magni-tudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second—that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents.
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  33. Silence Perception and Spatial Content.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):524-538.
    It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one can, in (...)
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  34. Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave (...)
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  35. Aesthetic perception and the puzzle of training.Madeleine Ransom - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-25.
    While the view that we perceive aesthetic properties may seem intuitive, it has received little in the way of explicit defence. It also gives rise to a puzzle. The first strand of this puzzle is that we often cannot perceive aesthetic properties of artworks without training, yet much aesthetic training involves the acquisition of knowledge, such as when an artwork was made, and by whom. How, if at all, can this knowledge affect our perception of an artwork’s aesthetic properties? (...)
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  36. Social Psychology, Phenomenology, and the Indeterminate Content of Unreflective Racial Bias.Alex Madva - 2019 - In Emily S. Lee (ed.), Race as Phenomena: Between Phenomenology and Philosophy of Race. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 87-106.
    Social psychologists often describe “implicit” racial biases as entirely unconscious, and as mere associations between groups and traits, which lack intentional content, e.g., we associate “black” and “athletic” in much the same way we associate “salt” and “pepper.” However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, albeit in partial, inarticulate, or even distorted ways. Moreover, evidence suggests that implicit biases are not “dumb” semantic associations, but instead reflect our skillful, norm-sensitive, and embodied engagement with (...)
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  37. Unconscious Perception and Unconscious Bias: Parallel Debates about Unconscious Content.Gabbrielle Johnson - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-130.
    The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues (...)
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  38. After-effects and the reach of perceptual content.Joulia Smortchkova - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7871-7890.
    In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the criterion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially perceptual properties, we can safely infer that high-level after-effects are perceptual as well. The critics of the criterion, on the other hand, assimilate (...)
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  39. Sensorimotor Signature, Skill, and Synaesthesia. Two Challenges for Enactive Theories of Perception.Joerg Fingerhut - 2011 - In Joerg Fingerhut, Sabine Flach & Jan Söffner (eds.), Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics. Peter Lang.
    The condition of ‘genuine perceptual synaesthesia’ has been a focus of attention in research in psychology and neuroscience over the last decades. For subjects in this condition stimulation in one modality automatically and consistently over the subject’s lifespan triggers a percept in another modality. In hearing→colour synaesthesia, for example, a specific sound experience evokes a perception of a specific colour. In this paper, I discuss questions and challenges that the phenomenon of synaesthetic experience raises for theories of perceptual experience (...)
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  40. Perception, force, and content.Dominic Gregory - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):891-904.
    [Open Access.] Perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology: we seem to encounter real situations in the course of visual experiences, for instance. The current paper articulates and defends the claim that the contents of at least some perceptual experiences are inherently presentational. On this view, perceptual contents are not always forceless in the way that, say, the propositional content that 2 + 2 = 4 is generally taken to be, as a content that may be asserted or denied or (...)
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  41. Conscious Perception in Favour of Essential Indexicality.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):13-30.
    It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in “The Inessential Indexical”, Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in (...)
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  42. Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?Keith A. Wilson - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89:841–860.
    Visual perception is widely taken to present properties such as redness, roundness, and so on. This in turn might be thought to give rise to accuracy conditions for experience, and so content, regardless of which metaphysical view of perception one endorses. An influential version of this argument—Susanna Siegel’s ’Argument from Appearing’—aims to establish the existence of content as common ground between representational and relational views of perception. This goes against proponents of ‘austere’ relationalism who deny that content (...)
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  43.  65
    (DRAFT) Can Moral Propositions Serve as Perceptual Content?Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - Taiwanese Philosophical Association Annual Conference 2021. Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue (...)
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  44. Procedure-Content Interaction in Attitudes to Law and in the Value of the Rule of Law: An Empirical and Philosophical Collaboration.Noam Gur & Jonathan Jackson - 2021 - In Meyerson Denise, Catriona Mackenzie & Therese MacDermott (eds.), Procedural Justice and Relational Theory: Empirical, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter begins with an empirical analysis of attitudes towards the law, which, in turn, inspires a philosophical re-examination of the moral status of the rule of law. In Section 2, we empirically analyse relevant survey data from the US. Although the survey, and the completion of our study, preceded the recent anti-police brutality protests sparked by the killing of George Floyd, the relevance of our observations extends to this recent development and its likely reverberations. Consistently with prior studies, we (...)
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  45. Risk Perception, Self-Efficacy, Trust in Government, and the Moderating Role of Perceived Social Media Content During the COVID-19 Pandemic.Hussam Al Halbusi - 2021 - Changing Societies and Personalities 5 (1):9-35.
    The public’s actions will likely have a significant effect on the course of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Human behavior is conditioned and shaped by information and people’s perceptions. This study investigated the impact of risk perception on trust in government and self-efficacy. It examined whether the use of social media helped people adopt preventive actions during the pandemic. To test this hypothesis, the researchers gathered data from 512 individuals (students and academics) based in Malaysia during the COVID-19 pandemic. (...)
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  46. The stakeholders' perceptions of the requirements of implementing innovative educational approaches in nursing: a qualitative content analysis study.Enayat A. Shabani - 2021 - BMC Nursing 20.
    Background Improving the competencies of nurses requires improving educational methods through the use of novel methods in teaching and learning. We aim to explore the perceptions of stakeholders (including nursing education directors, faculty members and nursing students) of the requirements of implementing innovative educational approaches in nursing. -/- Methods In this qualitative descriptive study, 19 participants, including educational directors, faculty members, and undergraduate and graduate nursing students, were selected through the purposeful sampling method. Achieving the theoretical saturation in extracted categories (...)
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  47. The neglected conscious subject in consciousness science: Commentary on “Beyond task response—Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness” by G. Northoff, F. Zilio & J. Zhang.Matthew Owen - 2024 - Physics of Life Reviews 50:61-62.
    Given the ever-present subject of consciousness wherever consciousness is, it is peculiar that consciousness researchers often mention mental states as if they are conscious independently of being the conscious states of someone [1, p. 132]. We refer to visual perceptions that become conscious, when in reality no one has ever studied mere conscious visual perceptions. What are studied are visual perceptions belonging to conscious human or animal subjects; it is the subjects who are conscious of visual stimuli, not the visual (...)
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  48. Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.
    In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.
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  49. (1 other version)Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors: Two Medieval Models of Active Perception in Peter Olivi and Peter Auriol.Lukáš Lička - 2017 - Perception in Scholastics and Their Interlocutors.
    In the paper I argue that medieval philosophers proposed several notions of the senses’ activity in perception. I illustrate the point using the example of two Franciscan thinkers – Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) and Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322). Olivi’s notion of active perception assumes that every perceptual act demands a prior focusing of the mind’s attention. Furthermore, Olivi is partially inspired by the extramissionist theories of vision and reinterprets the notion of a visual ray postulated by them as (...)
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  50.  93
    Perception in Dreams: A Guide for Dream Engineers, a Reflection on the Role of Memory in Sensory States, and a New Counterexample to Hume’s Account of the Imagination.Fiona Macpherson - 2024 - In Daniel Gregory & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues. Springer. pp. 353–381.
    I argue that dreams can contain perceptual elements in multifarious, heretofore unthought-of ways. I also explain the difference between dreams that contain perceptual elements, perceptual experiences that contain dream elements, and having a dream and a perceptual experience simultaneously. I then discuss two applications of the resulting view. First, I explain how my taxonomy of perception in dreams will allow “dream engineers”—who try to alter the content of people’s dreams—to accurately classify different dreams and explore creating new forms of (...)
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