On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism

Noûs 1 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even the proponent of the Expected Utility Objection should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PETOTE-6
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-07-18
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules.Predd, Joel; Seiringer, Robert; Lieb, Elliott; Osherson, Daniel; Poor, H. Vincent & Kulkarni, Sanjeev

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-07-18

Total views
176 ( #23,868 of 50,419 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #12,455 of 50,419 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.