Unveiling the Vote

British Journal of Political Science 20 (3):311-333 (1990)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The case for secrecy in voting depends on the assumption that voters reliably vote for the political outcomes they want to prevail. No such assumption is valid. Accordingly, voting procedures should be designed to provide maximal incentive for voters to vote responsibly. Secret voting fails this test because citizens are protected from public scrutiny. Under open voting, citizens are publicly answerable for their electoral choices and will be encouraged thereby to vote in a discursively defensible manner. The possibility of bribery, intimidation or blackmail moderates this argument but such dangers will be avoidable in many contemporary societies without recourse to secrecy.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-06-14
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.
An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?List, Christian & Pettit, Philip

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
50 ( #32,955 of 41,482 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #36,488 of 41,482 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.