On Bullshit Harry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 [Book Review]

Dialogue 45 (3):617-620 (2006)
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Abstract

According to Frankfurt’s analysis, bullshitting and lying necessarily differ in intention. I argue contra Frankfurt that (i) bullshitting can be lying, and that (ii) bullshitting need involve neither misrepresentation nor intention to deceive. My discussion suggests that bullshit is not capturable by a simple formula and that, although illuminating, Frankfurt’s analysis is limited to one paradigm.

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Karl Pfeifer
University of Saskatchewan

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