Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals

Studia Logica 102 (4):849-866 (2014)
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There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants’ responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed. I argue why neither logic nor standard probability theory provide appropriate rationality norms for uncertain conditionals. I advocate coherence based probability logic as an appropriate framework for investigating uncertain conditionals. Detailed proofs of the probabilistic non-informativeness of a paradox of the material conditional illustrate the approach from a formal point of view. I survey selected data on human reasoning about uncertain conditionals which additionally support the plausibility of the approach from an empirical point of view
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References found in this work BETA
Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference.Johnson-Laird, Philip & Byrne, Ruth M. J.
Measuring Coherence.Douven, Igor & Meijs, Wouter
Uncertainty and the de Finetti Tables.Baratgin, Jean; Over, David E. & Politzer, Guy
Betting on Conditionals.Baratgin, Jean; Over, David E. & Politzer, Guy

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Citations of this work BETA
Bayesian Reasoning with Ifs and Ands and Ors.Cruz, Nicole; Baratgin, Jean; Oaksford, Mike & Over, David E.
New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model.Singmann, Henrik; Klauer, Karl Christoph & Over, David
The Psychology of Uncertainty and Three-Valued Truth Tables.Baratgin, Jean; Politzer, Guy; Over, David E. & Takahashi, Tatsuji

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