- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Intuition, self-evidence, and understanding
In Landau Russ Shafer (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 28-44 (2016)
Abstract
Here I criticise Audi's account of self-evidece. I deny that understanding of a proposition can justify belief in it and offfer an account of intuition that can take the place of understanding in an account of self-evidence.Author's Profile
Analytics
Added to PP
2016-07-21
Downloads
2,699 (#3,379)
6 months
235 (#9,125)
2016-07-21
Downloads
2,699 (#3,379)
6 months
235 (#9,125)
Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?
