Results for 'Audi'

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  1. Critical Notice of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right.Anthony Skelton - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):305-325.
    Critical notice of Robert Audi's The Good in the Right in which doubts are raised about the epistemological and ethical doctrines it defends. It doubts that an appeal to Kant is a profitable way to defend Rossian normative intuitionism.
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  2. Church-State Separation, Healthcare Policy, and Religious Liberty.Robert Audi - 2014 - Journal of Practical Ethics 2 (1).
    This paper sketches a framework for the separation of church and state and, with the framework in view, indicates why a government’s maintaining such separation poses challenges for balancing two major democratic ideals: preserving equality before the law and protecting liberty, including religious liberty. The challenge is particularly complex where healthcare is either provided or regulated by government. The contemporary problem in question here is the contraception coverage requirement in the Obama Administration’s healthcare mandate. Many institutions have mounted legal challenges (...)
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  3.  3
    Tra Epistemologia Ed Etica. L'intuizionismo Moderato di Robert Audi.Angelo Campodonico - 2003 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 95 (3-4):545-578.
    The article concerns the moderate intuitionism of Robert Audi beteween epistemology and ethics.
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  4.  92
    Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant's Humanity Formula, by Robert Audi: New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, Pp. Xvi + 171, £29.99. [REVIEW]Paul Formosa - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):412-412.
    Book review of 'Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant's Humanity Formula, by Robert Audi, OUP'.
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  5. Rational Akrasia.John Brunero - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
    It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an (...)
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  6. Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding.Stratton-Lake Philip - 2016 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford: OUP. pp. 28-44.
    Here I criticise Audi's account of self-evidece. I deny that understanding of a proposition can justify belief in it and offfer an account of intuition that can take the place of understanding in an account of self-evidence.
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  7. Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue.Emer O'Hagan - 2017 - In Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York: Routledge. pp. 107-125.
    Persons interested in developing virtue will find attending to, and attempting to act on, the right reason for action a rich resource for developing virtue. In this paper I consider the role of self-knowledge in intentional moral development. I begin by making a general case that because improving one’s moral character requires intimate knowledge of its components and their relation to right reason, the aim of developing virtue typically requires the development of self-knowledge. I next turn to Kant’s ethics for (...)
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  8. Moral Knowledge Without Justification? A Critical Discussion of Intuitionist Moral Epistemology.Philipp Schwind - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Miami
    In this dissertation I discuss the epistemology of ethical intuitionism, in particular the claim that mature moral agents possess self-evident moral knowledge. Traditional intuitionists such as W.D. Ross have claimed that by reflection, we can acquire knowledge of our basic moral duties such as the duty of veracity or benevolence. Recent defenders of intuitionism such as Robert Audi have further developed this theory and argued that adequate understanding can be sufficient for moral knowledge. I criticize this view and argue (...)
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  9.  78
    A Postsecular Rationale – Religious and Secular as Epistemic Peers.Paolo Monti - 2013 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (2).
    In Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State, Robert Audi addresses disagreements among equally rational persons on political matters of coercion by analysing the features of discussions between epistemic peers, and supporting a normative principle of toleration. It is possible to question the extent to which Audi’s views are consistent with the possibility of religious citizens being properly defined as epistemic peers with their non-religious counterparts, insofar as he also argues for some significant constraints on religious (...)
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  10. The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (3):454-471.
    I admire Audi's intentions in discussing the rationality of beliefs, desires, and actions together, and doubt that this can be done internalistically, as he tries.
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  11. The Product of Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
    I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in (...)
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  12. The Sense of Natural Meaning in Conscious Inference.Anders Nes - 2016 - In T. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. Routledge. pp. 97-115.
    The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our sense of what is (...)
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  13. The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.
    Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen’s :191–207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification (...)
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  14. The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284.
    In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence (...)
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  15. Tinsel Bilimlerin Yöntemi Olarak Hermeneutiğin Tarihsel Seyri ve Pozitivist Anlayışın Neden Olduğu Yöntemsel Kriz.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı (ed.) - 2020 - Ankara, Türkiye: Gece Kitaplığı.
    Hermeneutik tarihsel süreç içerisinde hukuk, teoloji, tarih, sanat ve felsefe gibi çeşitli alanlarda farklı şekillerde tanımlanmış ve kullanılmış bir kavramdır. Bu doğrultuda, hermeneutiğin tam olarak belirlenebilmesi amacıyla, hermeneutik kelimesinin kökenine ve bu disiplinin tarihine mümkün olduğunca öz bir şekilde bakma gereksinimi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü hermeneutik disiplinini tek bir perspektiften değerlendirmek, onun temel gerçekliğini anlamamıza engel olacak çarpıtmaların gün yüzüne çıkmasına sebep olabilir. Genel anlamda bir ifadenin, anlamın, metnin ya da sanat eserinin belirli bir çerçeve içerisinde yorumlanması olarak değerlendirilen hermeneutik, felsefe (...)
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  16. The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
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  17. CORCORAN'S 27 ENTRIES IN THE 1999 SECOND EDITION.John Corcoran - 1999 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. CAMBRIDGE UP. pp. 65-941.
    Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more (...)
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  18.  38
    Dependence Asymmetry Between Truth and Reality.Jiamin Yu - manuscript
    The thesis aims to account for the pre-theoretic intuition of asymmetric dependence between truth and reality, namely, the intuition that truth depends on reality, but reality doesn’t depend on truth. I start by delineating a framework to answer this question: according to this framework, a proper theory of dependence asymmetry should explain why truth depends on reality (truth-reality dependence) and why reality doesn’t depend on truth (asymmetry). There are two readings of the second requirement: a strong reading and a weak (...)
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  19. Conversely: Extrapropositional and Prosentential.John Corcoran & Sriram Nambiar - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):404-5.
    This self-contained lecture examines uses and misuses of the adverb conversely with special attention to logic and logic-related fields. Sometimes adding conversely after a conjunction such as and signals redundantly that a converse of what preceded will follow. -/- (1) Tarski read Church and, conversely, Church read Tarski. -/- In such cases, conversely serves as an extrapropositional constituent of the sentence in which it occurs: deleting conversely doesn’t change the proposition expressed. Nevertheless it does introduce new implicatures: a speaker would (...)
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  20. Let’s Be Reasonable: Feminism and Rationality.Deborah K. Heikes - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):127-134.
    Feminist philosophy is highly critical of Cartesian, and more broadly Enlightenment, conceptions of rationality. However, feminist philosophers typically fail to address contemporary theories of rationality and to consider how more current thoeories address feminist concerns. I argue that, contrary to their protestations, feminists are “obsessing over an outdated conception of reason” and that even the most suspect of “malestream” philosophers express an understanding of rationality that is closer to feminist concerns than Cartesian ones. I begin by briefly examining key features (...)
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