Our Phenomenal Universe: Resolving the Mind-Body Problem


Many philosophers argue that the mind-body problem is unresolvable, that there are irreconcilable differences between the physical world and the way the mind experiences it. Several others argue that the problem represents an incompleteness of the Galilean view, which conceptually divides the world into two models (physical and consciousness). Recent debates have centered around a proposal to radically alter the physical model to account for the mind-body relationship. However, critics argue that the general approach is flawed and that the specific proposal results in a ‘messy’ and highly complex model with inconsistencies with well-known phenomena. This paper, first, critically examines the argument that the general approach is flawed. Then this paper argues that the proposal is much broader than necessary and that the aspects required to resolve the mind-body problem do not significantly alter the physical model. This results in, I argue, a resolution to the mind-body problem without increased complexity for either model or the aforementioned inconsistencies.

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