Seeing Seeing
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):24-43 (2021)
Abstract
I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.
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2019-07-11
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2019-07-11
Total views
226 ( #26,074 of 2,438,869 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #17,596 of 2,438,869 )
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