Seeing Seeing

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Abstract
I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.
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First archival date: 2019-07-11
Latest version: 4 (2019-07-16)
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References found in this work BETA
The Modularity of Mind.Cummins, Robert & Fodor, Jerry
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Butterfill, Stephen A. & Apperly, Ian A.

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2019-07-11

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