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  1. What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  2. Animal Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Springer: Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    This chapter addresses the extent to which nonhuman animals are conscious. Most important perhaps is what criteria should be used in making such a determination.
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  3. IX—Wittgenstein and Physicalism.James Hopkins - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):121-146.
    Wittgenstein's private language argument refutes the Cartesian conception of the mind and thereby clears the way for a physicalistic understanding of phenomenology.
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  4. How We Affect Each Other. Michel Henry's 'Pathos-With' and the Enactive Approach to Intersubjectivity.Hanne De Jaegher - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):112-132.
    What makes it possible to affect one another, to move and be moved by another person? Why do some of our encounters transform us? The experience of moving one another points to the inter-affective in intersubjectivity. Inter-affection is hard to account for under a cognitivist banner, and has not received much attention in embodied work on intersubjectivity. I propose that understanding inter-affection needs a combination of insights into self-affection, embodiment, and interaction processes. I start from Michel Henry's radically immanent idea (...)
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  5. Skepticism About Other Minds.Anil Gomes - forthcoming - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  6. Folk Psychological Narratives. The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):341-346.
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  7. Einfühlung und Empathie.Monika Dullstein - forthcoming - In T. Breyer (ed.), Grenzen der Empathie. Philosophische, psychologische und anthropologische Perspektiven. Wilhelm Fink.
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  8. Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein’s Account of Empathy.Monika Dullstein - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...)
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  9. The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate.Monika Dullstein - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.
    It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...)
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  10. How Many Minds?Hugh S. Chandler - manuscript
    In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate minds'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘minds’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people with minds. -/- .
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  11. Truth and Knowledge of Other Minds.Alex Burri & Stephan Furrer - 1994 - In Gianfranco Soldati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 1: Philosophy of Mind. CSLI Publications. pp. 39-43.
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  12. Agents, Mechanisms, and Other Minds.Douglas C. Long - 1979 - In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 129--148.
    One of the goals of physiologists who study the detailed physical, chemical,and neurological mechanisms operating within the human body is to understand the intricate causal processes which underlie human abilities and activities. It is doubtless premature to predict that they will eventually be able to explain the behaviour of a particular human being as we might now explain the behaviour of a pendulum clock or even the invisible changes occurring within the hardware of a modern electronic computer. Nonetheless, it seems (...)
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Analogy and Other Minds
  1. Two Analogy Strategies: The Cases of Mind Metaphors and Introspection.Eugen Fischer - 2018 - Connection Science 30 (2):211-243.
    Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, analogical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs different mapping strategies: In problem-solving, it employs analogy-maximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner & Markman 1997); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden 2015). The two strategies interact in analogical reasoning with conceptual metaphors. This interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these hypotheses through case-studies on ‘mind’-metaphors from ordinary discourse, and abstract problem-solving in (...)
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  2. Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine.Chad Engelland - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):25-48.
    This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine’s treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life, that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates our own body; seeing other animated bodies enables us (...)
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  3. The Force of Sympathy in the Ethics of David Hume.Lorenzo Greco - 2012 - In Lorenzo Greco & Alessio Vaccari (eds.), Hume Readings. Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 193-210.
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  4. Analogy.Todd Davies - 1985 - In CSLI Informal Notes Series. Stanford, CA, USA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, No. IN-CSLI-85-4,.
    This essay (a revised version of my undergraduate honors thesis at Stanford) constructs a theory of analogy as it applies to argumentation and reasoning, especially as used in fields such as philosophy and law. The word analogy has been used in different senses, which the essay defines. The theory developed herein applies to analogia rationis, or analogical reasoning. Building on the framework of situation theory, a type of logical relation called determination is defined. This determination relation solves a puzzle about (...)
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  5. A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Theodore Bach - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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Abduction and Other Minds
  1. On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  2. Cartesianism, the Embodied Mind, and the Future of Cognitive Research.Philippe Gagnon - 2015 - In Dirk Evers, Michael Fuller, Anne Runehov & Knut-Willy Sæther (eds.), Do Emotions Shape the World? Biennial Yearbook of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology 2015-2016. Martin-Luther-Universität. pp. 225-244.
    In his oft-cited book Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio claims that Descartes is responsible for having stifled the development of modern neurobiological science, in particular as regards the objective study of the physical and physiological bases for emotive and socially-conditioned cognition. Most of Damasio’s book would stand without reference to Descartes, so it is intriguing to ask why he launched this attack. What seems to fuel such claims is a desire for a more holistic understanding of the mind, the brain and (...)
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  3. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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Criteria and Other Minds
  1. Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence.Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) - 2004 - Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
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  2. “Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2004 - In Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
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  3. “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2004 - In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
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  4. Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
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  5. The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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Concepts of Other Minds
  1. Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?Marek Pokropski - 2017 - Hybris. Revista de Filosofía 38:58-73.
    In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with (...)
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  2. XII—Is There a Problem of Other Minds?Anil Gomes - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
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  3. Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine.Chad Engelland - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):25-48.
    This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine’s treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life, that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates our own body; seeing other animated bodies enables us (...)
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  4. Troubles with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy.Arindam Chakrabarti - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):23-36.
    In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva philosopher (...)
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  5. Other Minds and Perceived Identity.Anil Gomes - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
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  6. The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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  7. Applying the Concept of Pain.Charles Sayward - 2003 - Iyyun 52 (July):290-300.
    This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
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Direct Knowledge and Other Minds
  1. Enactivism, Other Minds, and Mental Disorders.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" (DSP): the (...)
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  2. Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.
    I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...)
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  3. Seeing the Invisible: How to Perceive, Imagine, and Infer the Minds of Others.Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Erkenntnis (2):1-25.
    The psychology and phenomenology of our knowledge of other minds is not well captured either by describing it simply as perception, nor by describing it simply as inference. A better description, I argue, is that our knowledge of other minds involves both through ‘perceptual co-presentation’, in which we experience objects as having aspects that are not revealed. This allows us to say that we perceive other minds, but perceive them as private, i.e. imperceptible, just as we routinely perceive aspects of (...)
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  4. Expressions, Looks and Others' Minds.William E. S. McNeill - forthcoming - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what (...)
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  5. Perception, Evidence, and Our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.Anil Gomes - forthcoming - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), volume on the problem of other minds. Oxford University Press.
    ‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...)
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  6. XII—Is There a Problem of Other Minds?Anil Gomes - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
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  7. On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  8. Direct Social Perception.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Albert Newen, Leon de Bruin & Gallagher Shaun (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition.
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  9. Empathy.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage Publications.
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  10. The Space Between Us: Embodiment and Intersubjectivity in Watsuji and Levinas.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett & Sarah Mattice (eds.), Levinas and Asian Thought. Duquesne University Press. pp. 53-78.
    This essay brings Emmanuel Levinas and Watsuji Tetsurō into constructive philosophical engagement. Rather than focusing primarily on interpretation — admittedly an important dimension of comparative philosophical inquiry — my intention is to put their respective views to work, in tandem, and address the problem of the embodied social self.1 Both Watsuji and Levinas share important commonalities with respect to the embodied nature of intersubjectivity —commonalities that, moreover, put both thinkers in step with some of the concerns driving current treatments of (...)
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  11. Phenomenology and the Visibility of the Mental.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan 29:13-25.
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  12. Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
    The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading (...)
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  13. On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
    Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine (...)
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  14. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  15. Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value.Joel Smith - 2016 - In Julian Dodd (ed.), Art, Mind, and Narrative, Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press.
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account of value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
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  16. The Perceptibility of Emotion.Joel Smith - 2018 - In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 130-148.
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can perceive others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
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  17. Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds.Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
    We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.
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  18. The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading.Joel Smith - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):274-293.
    I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.
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