Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?

Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. We argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution–his attempted solution does not deny compositionality. The correct characterization of Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PICDSR
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-12-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Frege's Puzzle.Salmon, Nathan U.
A Puzzle About Belief.Kripke, Saul A.
Frege's Puzzle.Forbes, Graeme & Salmon, Nathan

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-01-07

Total views
428 ( #7,433 of 43,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #8,676 of 43,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.